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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW REFORM IN JAPAN: 
FROM THE LOST DECADE TO THE END OF HISTORY? 
Abstract: Japan is in the midst of massive law reform. Mired in ongoing 
recession since the early 1990s, Japan has been implementing a new 
regulatory blueprint to kickstart a sluggish economy through structural 
change. A key element to this reform process is a rethink of corporate 
governance and its stakeholder relations. With a patchwork of legislative 
initiatives in areas as diverse as corporate law, finance, labour relations, 
consumer protection, public administration and civil justice, this new 
model is beginning to take shape.  
But to what extent does this model represent a break from the past? 
Some commentators are breathlessly predicting the “Americanisation” 
of Japanese law. They see the triumph of Western-style capitalism — the 
“End of History”, to borrow the words of Francis Fukuyama — with its 
emphasis on market-based, arms-length transactions. Others are more 
cautious, advancing the view that there new reforms are merely 
“creative twists” on what is a uniquely (although slowly evolving) 
strand of Japanese capitalism.  
This paper takes issue with both interpretations. It argues that the new 
reforms merely follow Japan’s long tradition of ‘adopting and adapting’ 
foreign models to suit domestic purposes. They are neither the 
wholesale importation of “Anglo-Saxon” regulatory principles nor a thin 
veneer over a ‘uniquely unique’ form of Confucian cultural capitalism. 
Rather, they represent a specific and largely political solution 
(conservative reformism) to a current economic problem (recession). 
 
iv
The larger themes of this paper are ‘change’ and ‘continuity’. ‘Change’ 
suggests evolution to something identifiable; ‘continuity’ suggests 
adhering to an existing state of affairs. Although notionally opposites, 
‘change’ and ‘continuity’ have something in common — they both 
suggest some form of predictability and coherence in regulatory reform. 
Our paper, by contrast, submits that Japanese corporate governance 
reform or, indeed, law reform more generally in Japan, is context-
specific, multi-layered (with different dimensions not necessarily pulling 
all in the same direction – for example, in relations with key outside 
suppliers), and therefore more random or ‘chaotic’. 
Author Contact: Dr. Luke Nottage and Leon Wolff 
Co-Directors, Australian Network for Japanese Law 













CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW REFORM IN JAPAN: 
FROM THE LOST DECADE TO THE END OF HISTORY?* 
Luke Nottage & Leon Wolff 
 
I. FROM THE LOST DECADE TO THE END OF HISTORY? 
Much has been made of Japan’s ‘lost decade’. With economic 
stagnation, financial crisis and record corporate insolvencies 
during the 1990s, Japan’s once all-mighty economic machine 
appears to have lost its way. But sluggishness in economic 
performance stands in contrast to an enormous burst of activity in 
law reform. On a scale comparable to the massive legal innovation 
when Japan re-opened to the world in the Meiji Restoration from 
1868 and the democraticisation of constitutional and economic 
law during the Allied Occupation from 1945 to 1952, Japan is 
embarking on a ‘third wave’ of legal and regulatory reform. The 
primary driver of the reform movement is growing desperation to 
regain economic momentum. A guiding theme is dismantling ex 
ante regulation of businesses primarily by public authorities and 
introducing more indirect means of ex post control by empowering 
private entities with private or corporate law remedies.1 
                                            
* The core of this chapter builds heavily on Nottage (2001b) and its Working 
Paper version available through http://www.iue.it/PUB/WorkingPapers.shtml, 
extensively updated and supplemented by research drawing on the authors' 
work as contributing editors for the Japan tab of the CCH Doing Business in 
Asia looseleaf/CD-ROM service (Nottage and Wolff 2000-3). Additional 
references and data can be found in those works. In addition to those 
acknowledged therein, we acknowledge valuable feedback and information from 
Phil Jamieson of Nagashima Ohno Tsunematsu and participants in the 2004 
Corporate Law Teachers’ Association Conference (8-11 February, Australian 
National University). All internet references were available at the URLs given 
as of 1 February 2004. 
1 However, Schaede (2000, 2003) argues that another theme of the reform 
movement is that public regulation by bureaucracies is giving way to self-




What should be made of these legal developments? An emerging 
line of analysis is that Japanese law is in the process of 
‘Americanisation’. According to Daniel Keleman and Eric Sibbitt 
(2002), for example, the Americanisation of Japanese law is evident 
from accelerating economic liberalisation, political fragmentation, 
and greater ‘legalisation’ in everyday life in Japan since the ‘lost 
decade’. Curtis Milhaupt (2003), too, submits that, despite some 
‘stickiness’ in traditional corporate governance norms, Japanese 
corporate law is taking on more visibly American shape. The core 
claim is that American law represent the global standard in 
corporate regulation, and that Japan is inching its way — 
inexorably — towards adopting this standard.  
This thesis of the Americanisation of Japanese law recalls Francis 
Fukuyama’s (1992) famous prediction about the ‘end of history’ — 
that U.S.-style political democracy and market-based economic 
ordering would triumph in the post-communist order. The 
attraction of Fukuyama’s ideas has not been limited to political 
scientists, economists, and business leaders. They have also found 
traction in the legal academy. For example, Henry Hansmann and 
Reiner Kraakman (2001), law professors from Yale and Harvard 
respectively, prophesised the ‘end of history for corporate law’. 
They write in support of continued and accelerating convergence 
on a shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance, 
involving extensive use of market-based control mechanisms to 
guide corporate activity and corporate law. Paralleling Fukuyama, 
Hansmann and Kraakman (2001: 443-9) emphasize the ‘failure of 
alternative models’: the ‘manager-oriented model’ (popular in the 
US until the 1960s), the ‘labour-oriented model’ (entrenched 
primarily in Germany), the ‘state-oriented model’ (perceived as 
dominating post-war France and Japan), and ‘stakeholder models’ 
(seen as mere variants on older manager- or labour-oriented 
models). They then argue that competitive pressures will cause 
                                                                                                                
regulation by private industry associations. Less globally competitive industries 
are tending to adopt self-regulation with more risk of anti-competitive effects.  
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convergence on the shareholder-oriented model and highlight the 
rise of the shareholder class worldwide, conceding, however, that 
change has so far occurred at the level more of corporate practices 
than of formal legal rules. Other commentators have taken this a 
step further, in the related area of competition law, implying ‘the 
end of anti-trust history’.  
This triumphalism — that American law represents both the 
pinnacle of legal achievement and the global standard to which 
other legal systems aspire to achieve — has attracted many critics. 
Some, for example, argue that US anti-trust law and practice has a 
bifurcated tradition, with one strand closer to the European 
Union’s model of regulation more through administrative agencies 
than private enforcement for the primary benefit of dispersed 
consumers (Perez 2002). Others contend that a ‘general process of 
Americanisation in legal thinking’ – or ‘imperial law’ – is ‘a 
dominant layer in world-wide legal systems’, but one underpinned 
by ‘a spectacular process of exaggeration, aimed at building 
consent for the purpose of hegemonic domination’ (Mattei 2003: 
383), and encountering resistance in continental Europe. 
Moreover, doubts have been raised about the straightforward 
Americanisation of corporate law. For example, von Nessen (1999, 
2003) notes that the wave of reforms to Australian corporate law 
since the late 1990s, although inspired by some specific US 
developments and more general concepts, were filtered through 
the lens of an English law tradition. Further, Australian law 
reforms encounter local circumstances (see generally Cheffins 
2002). Full-scale ‘Americanisation of Japanese law’ seems equally, 
if not more, implausible. Indeed, aspects of Japanese private law 
may be undergoing a new round of ‘Europeanisation’ and more 
idiosyncratic globalisation (Nottage 2004).  
This chapter aims to assess claims of Americanisation of Japanese 
law by critically examining the recent raft of reforms to Japanese 
corporate governance. At first blush, there is much to suggest 
Americanisation. First, corporate governance has indeed shifted 
towards a more shareholder-oriented model: the law now provides 
for more direct control potential for shareholders to monitor 




opportunistic managers. Second, certain non-shareholders 
(especially creditors) are empowered with greater arms’ length 
control mechanisms. However, the degree and direction of the 
transformations vary according to the stakeholder (Nottage 2001b). 
For example, direct controls by employees, still an important 
stakeholder in Japanese companies, are declining more slowly. 
Further, suppliers, consumers, government authorities and even 
NGOs appear still more prepared to interact with companies and 
managers on the basis of trust, rather than designing control 
mechanisms on the assumption that there will always be 
opportunism or deviance which needs to be guarded against (cf 
also Fukuyama 1996). In short, Japanese corporate governance – 
and indeed its entire system of capitalism – is converging to a 
degree on the US model, but at divergent rates seemingly related 
to resilient underlying norms and philosophies (see also Sarra and 
Nakahigashi 2002). It may be that this is a temporary situation, on 
the way to a more consistent end of history à la américaine. But it 
seems more likely that this is more or less a new equilibrium, as 
seems to have been reached also in German corporate law reform 
(du Plessis 2004). The picture in Japan is clouded by complexity 
within economic ordering as well as greater competition in 
politics (cf Dore 2000). This more ‘chaotic’ outcome, combining 
change with elements of continuity, may be difficult for 
economists, political scientists and lawyers to handle; but should 
be more readily appreciated by practitioners and analysts of 
business management, where messy practical realities are valued 
as well as elegant theory. 
II. REALIGNING STAKEHOLDERS IN JAPANESE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
This chapter adopts a stakeholder analysis to outline the contours 
of change and continuity. Although the relationship between 
managers and shareholders is central to conceptualising the 
operation of corporate entities, other stakeholders are also 
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influential, including creditors, employees or suppliers, and even 
local residents or government authorities.2  
A stakeholder analysis focuses attention on major problems 
common to all stakeholder relationship. An important problem is 
incomplete information. If all shared full information, 
shareholders or creditors, for instance, would not have to worry 
about managers wasting their money. Yet in the real world, 
incomplete information gives rise to the dual problems of ‘adverse 
selection’ (‘hidden information’, resulting for example in creditors 
accepting to lend money to what turn out to be generally high-risk 
firms) and ‘moral hazard’ (‘hidden action’, for example managers 
investing loaned funds into excessively high risk projects). These 
difficulties are compounded by others: (i) the inability to write 
contracts for the stakeholder relationships which expressly 
provide for all possible contingencies, because of the limits in 
foreseeing future scenarios (Hoshi 1998: 849-850); and (ii) the 
inability to perfectly enforce those contracts. These definitions of 
adverse selection and moral hazard highlight underlying problems 
of opportunism and bounded rationality (Williamson 1996). They 
can be usefully developed to uncover and structure empirical data 
concerning relations involving managers and shareholders (II.1 
below), creditors of the firm (Part II.2), and employees (Part II.3). 
The overall picture is one of (i) significant rapprochement of 
manager and shareholder interests and the (ii) elimination of 
cartel-like regulation of banks and other financial institutions; but 
(iii) less obvious or more gradual pressures reshaping employment 
relations. 
Yet raw opportunism may not be the only force at work (Part II.4). 
A stakeholder analysis can also reveal robust patterns of 
cooperative relations among participants. Consider, for example, 
the automobile industry in post-war Japan and, subsequently in 
                                            
2 Cf also Kester 1996; Ballon and Honda 2000. Tsuru (1999: 3) cautions that such 
a broad definition of corporate governance may risk analytic looseness (see also 
Cioffi 2000. But cf Aoki 2003. 




the U.S. Where an expanding group of participants engage in quite 
radical information gathering and sharing among one another, they 
entrenching trust, leading to the emergence of novel forms of 
corporate governance (Helper, McDuffie and Sabel 2000). Although 
the overall trend is towards arms’ length relations in Japan, 
cooperation is still in evidence. In particular, there is evidence of 
new patterns of cooperation at the level of the Japanese state and 
civil society (Schwartz and Pharr eds 2003), increasingly important 
stakeholders in corporate organizations.  
A. SHAREHOLDERS BECOMING PRIMARY STAKEHOLDERS 
The separation of ownership from control in public listed 
companies,3 leading to the emergence of a distinct managerial class 
with interests no longer necessarily aligned with shareholders, has 
become an agreed starting point for analysing corporate 
governance since being highlighted in the US by Berle and Means 
(1991 [originally 1932]). Particularly since Japan’s US-led 
Occupation following World War II, successive reforms to Japanese 
corporate law have often been directed precisely at protecting 
shareholders’ rights (Hayakawa 1997).  
In fact, from the perspective of agency theory, two categories of 
constraints are available to shareholders to counter particularly 
the informational advantage held by managers. The first is ‘control 
oriented’. The shareholders monitor management behaviour, often 
delegating this to a Board of Directors whom they elect; and they 
intervene if necessary, for example by a proxy vote fight, to replace 
directors and hence managers. However, the costs involved in this 
                                            
3 There are about 9,000 such companies in Japan (Kanda 1998 contains useful 
further background corporate data), including about 6330 with sufficient capital 
for listing (Yasui 1999: 3). Closely held companies, in which shareholders 
typically remain managers or are closely related to them, offer different avenues 
for opportunistic behaviour. Despite their aggregate importance in the Japanese 
economy, these companies’ problems have not generated the same degree of law 
reform and discussion in recent years (see for example Shishido 1990). This 
chapter therefore only mentions them in passing (at Part II.2). 
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system usually make it more attractive to large shareholders with 
good management skills themselves. A second system available to 
shareholders, ‘arm’s length’ control, is more passive. The 
shareholders do not actively intervene in management. However, 
they take action when dissatisfied with managers, especially by 
selling shares, which may lower share prices and for example 
encourage hostile takeovers. Alternatively, indirect control can be 
promoted through institutions better aligning the interests of 
managers with shareholders, for example through high-powered 
incentive methods such as very profit-sensitive bonuses or stock 
options (Hoshi 1998: 851-2). The received wisdom about 
companies in post-War Japan is that such arm’s length controls 
have been particularly weak. 
Openly hostile takeovers have certainly been rare.4 In large part, 
this is due to the development of extensive cross-shareholdings 
among firms. The main reason for cross-shareholdings emerging 
remains unclear, although most accounts point to stock market 
weaknesses soon after World War II, when capital was needed by 
companies and the threat of takeovers was high. Ironically, cross-
shareholding also may have developed because Japanese corporate 
law, influenced by U.S. law, further extended substantive rights to 
shareholders, yet many of those rights have remained mandatory 
(Shishido 2000: 211). Japanese managers therefore may have 
encouraged the development of cross-shareholding as an 
alternative way to protect their interests.5  
                                            
4 Nonetheless, there have been several major hostile takeover battles since the 
late 1990s. Tokumoto (2001) discusses four that resulted in court judgments, 
and criticises Japanese judges for too readily thwarting takeovers by allowing 
incumbent directors to issues shares to third parties (ostensibly due to a need to 
raise capital). Another well-publicised case of ‘greenmail’ involved a US 
investor, T Boone Pickens, between 1989 and 1991 (Reich 2001). 
5 See also Takahashi 1997: 232. Managers in the US and elsewhere have been 
able to invoke other techniques more recently, through tailoring their corporate 
constitutions etc (for example ‘poison pills’ whereby a debenture etc must be 
issued if an investor purchases more than a set percentage of shares, or 




Nonetheless, some arm’s length control continued to be exercised 
through ostensibly ‘friendly’ takeovers or mergers. These often 
occurred in the context of poor performance, reflected in weak 
share prices; and strong correlations have been found between 
share price weakness and resignations of managers (Kaplan and 
Ramseyer 1996). Thus, while managers are not replaced by those 
taking over firms, as in hostile bids, they retire ‘voluntarily’. 
Shishido (2000: 216) provides one important causal explanation for 
this pattern: Japanese firms who perform badly on the sharemarket 
find it difficult to raise equity finance, and that makes it more 
difficult to obtain debt finance from banks. Such pressures have 
grown as Japan has mired itself in recession. Conversely, he notes 
some recent evidence that pressures from the Japanese share 
market already are forcing some firms to restructure their labor 
relations, and then signaling satisfaction with that management 
response in the form of higher share prices (idem, fn 112). Overall, 
moreover, aggregate cross-shareholding in publically traded shares 
has declined significantly since the stock market collapse and 
burst of Japan’s ‘bubble’ economy in the early 1990s.6 Further, 
building from this competing tradition of such indirect control 
mechanisms and more recent changes to Japan’s socio-economic 
environment, a few ‘norm entrepreneurs’ are now openly 
embarking on hostile takeover activity (Milhaupt 2001: 21-23). A 
growing body of empirical research shows how significant change 
can be achieved in Japan by law reform legitimizing new social 
                                                                                                                
arrangements to limit to voting rights to a minority percentage even if the 
investor obtains more than that percentage of shares). The liberalisation of 
stock option schemes in Japan may open the way to such stratagems, but this 
possibility has not been openly discussed much (Kozuka 2003). It probably 
awaits a more comprehensive move towards pro-active commercial lawyering 
linked to major reforms now underway in the Japanese legal profession 
(Kobayashi 2003). 
6 Takahashi 1997: 233-4. Indeed the pace seems to be accelerating (for example 
Shishido 2000: 226, Table 6). As well as banks’ immediate need to cash-up, this 
trend may be underpinned by a more forward-looking appreciation that main 
bank shareholdings have tended to be in firms with smaller prospects for growth 
(evidenced by Hori and Osano 2002). 
2005] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW REFORM IN JAPAN 9 
 
 
norms, or reinforcing selected existing ones.7 With takeovers, a 
quite amenable legal framework has long been in place, in terms of 
formal substantive law provisions, and that may make it even 
easier for social norms to be reformulated and take root. Milhaupt 
and West (2001) argue that this process is already underway, 
underpinned by takeovers’ potential to promote efficient diversity 
in corporate organisations. 
More directly aligning the interests of managers and shareholders 
has met with more mixed success. Stock option schemes have 
been progressively liberalized since the mid-1990s, and in 2002 the 
Tokyo District Court adopted an interpretation favourable to the 
taxpayer. However, this has been appealed by the government, and 
tax legislation continues to change. Also, the stock options 
involved in this litigation were issued by foreign companies. 8 Still, 
stock option schemes appear to have steadily gained in popularity, 
with 800 Japanese companies reportedly having them by 2000 
(Ahmadjian 2003: 222). However, such schemes may be subjected 
to increasing scrutiny if and when committees for remunerating 
managers are established (as discussed below) and Japan’s 
sharemarket revives significantly, even though executive 
remuneration in Japan has remained comparatively low. Problems 
of excessive remuneration have been exposed in countries like the 
US and Australia following spectacular corporate collapses in 
recent years (Clarke et al 2003), highlighting the need for 
transparency and some limits in setting remuneration packages to 
provide incentives to managers to work in shareholders’ interests 
(Hill and Yablon 2003). Similar issues arise with bonuses and other 
remuneration for managers which are tightly tied to performance. 
Although these have not been common in post-War Japan either, 
performance-linked employment is steadily replacing seniority-
                                            
7 For example West 1997, Feldman 2001, Nottage 2004. 
8 Watanabe 2004, discussing mainly the Microsoft case, decided on 26 
November 2002 and reported in 1106 Hanrei Taimuzu, p. 28. He notes that on 
the same day, the Tokyo District Court decided a quite similar case involving 
Compaq. 




based ‘life-long’ employment even in the larger blue-chip 
companies (Shibata 2002; and generally Part II.3 below). 
Compounding this shift, whereas shareholders may have achieved 
some indirect arm’s length control over managers because of the 
latter’s ‘career concerns’ – tying their reputation to company 
performance (Tsuru 1999: 5) – Japan’s protracted economic 
stagnation appears to be underpinning the slow emergence of 
alternative mechanisms. 
At the same time, control-oriented mechanisms have been 
expanding too. To be sure, as cross-shareholdings have declined, 
the potential for such shareholders to exercise direct control over 
managers in the other companies has been reduced. However, such 
control was limited anyway, due to relatively small blocs of shares 
being held by rather loosely affiliated groups, perhaps reinforced by 
a norm against active intervention which made sense during 
Japan’s era of strong economic growth. A much more important 
direct check on managers has been exercised by ‘main banks’, 
often holding an even smaller shareholding in the client firm 
(statutorily limited to 5 percent), but able to monitor its 
performance by providing a broad array of services and to 
intervene if necessary (Milhaupt 2002). As mentioned below (Part 
II.2), however, the main bank system has come under even greater 
pressure than cross-shareholdings generally, due to crises and 
deregulation in financial markets especially since the late 1990s.  
Nonetheless, at least partially offsetting these two trends, the 
potential for more control-oriented checks on managers has been 
expanded by the growing importance of institutional investors in 
Japan, as elsewhere. Japan’s pension funds and the like now find 
themselves in dire financial straits, with no guarantees – even 
implicit – that the government will be interested or able to bail 
them out, given its own crisis in preparing for a rapidly ageing 
population (Morgan 2001). Even more significant, at least to the 
mind of many Japanese managers in recent years, is the growing 
‘presence’ of foreign pension funds demanding better results and 
transparency from the firms they invest in (Ahmadjian 2003: 232-
3). In the shadow of major changes in accounting standards, ‘return 
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on equity’ has become a more pervasive concern even among firms 
with no or limited foreign investment, as evidenced by the recent 
popularity of share buy-backs.9  
Even smaller investors, including a now strong proportion from 
abroad in the wake of Japan’s stockmarket downturn over the 
1990s, can also exert direct control through actual or potential 
derivative actions against managers who fail to act in the best 
interests of the company, including the interests of shareholders. 
Following a reduction in filing fees in 1993, the numbers of 
derivative lawsuits have grown rapidly. Activist lawyers and 
groups have emerged, taking advantage of the new institutional 
realities and promoting another shift in norms about the ‘proper’ 
role for shareholder interests, illustrated and cemented by a 
remarkable victory in 2000 against Daiwa Bank executives. 
Concerns on the part of mangers about personal liability in such 
litigation led in 2002 to further law reforms to limit somewhat the 
scope or effects of derivative actions (Black and Cheffins 2003: 83). 
However, the legal and socio-economic framework for derivative 
actions remains very different from that present at the start of 
Japan’s lost decade (West 2001b). 
Some skeptics suggest that the restrictions enacted in 2002 were 
primarily a ‘defensive’ reaction promoted by managers, as indeed 
                                            
9 Amendments to the Commercial Code, coming into operation on 1 October 
2001, removed the restrictions on share buy-back schemes. Under the new 
provisions, share buy-backs are permitted provided the repurchase is authorized 
by shareholders in advance at the annual general meeting and the repurchase is 
funded out of distributable profits. Share buybacks give shareholders a greater 
share of company profits. This is because share repurchases transfer wealth 
from selling shareholders to the residual shareholders, and increases earnings 
per share. Major Japanese companies (spearheaded for example by Sony, 
Matsushita, NTT, Honda and Toyota) are increasingly using these new powers 
to protect the value of shareholders’ equity investments. According to a report 
in the Japan Times (20 May 2002), Japanese companies listed on the first section 
of the Tokyo Stock Exchange have announced share buy-back plans involving 
4.2 trillion yen worth of shares, double that which was repurchased in all of 
fiscal year 2001.  




were reductions in the large numbers of managers traditionally 
elected to Boards of Directors in Japan. They emphasized how only 
remaining Board members, not the new category of ‘executive 
officers’, were left at risk of derivative actions. However, this shift 
to smaller boards seems to have begun in the late 1990s (Moerke 
2003). Further, downsizing was initiated primarily by Sony, a well-
managed company with high foreign ownership. It also committed 
itself to including independent directors on the downsized Board, 
emphasizing its role as a monitor (especially on behalf of 
shareholders) over the activities of executive officers and other 
line managers. Sony’s new system therefore seems better 
explained by pressures like those described above, particularly the 
more or less latent demands of investors, and a realisation that 
other mechanisms minimizing poor managerial performance were 
being undermined precisely as Japanese companies were being 
exposed to ever-greater legal and economic risks.  
Further, by June 2001, 35.7 percent of listed companies had already 
adopted what Puchniak (2003) calls a ‘Sony Type Company’ model 
and 24.4 percent of companies were contemplating adopting it. In 
other words, only 40 percent of companies still seemed wedded to 
the ‘Old Type Company’ model, involving a very large Board 
(including many managers primarily with executive 
responsibilities), complemented by ‘statutory auditors’ or ‘auditing 
officers’ (kansayaku) supposed to monitor certain activities of the 
Board. In 2002, the Commercial Code was amended to allow large 
companies to retain either of these structures, or adopt either what 
Puchniak terms a ‘New Type Company’ variant on Sony’s original 
model, or a ‘Reformed Old Type Company’ model instead further 
boosting the kansayaku system. As highlighted in Chart 1 below, 
key differences between the ‘Sony Type Company’ model and the 
‘New Type Company’ model are that the latter demands at least 
two outside directors, key decisions (for example on remuneration) 
must be made by committees involving some them, and officers 
are also open to shareholder derivative suits.  
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CHART 1: JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS AFTER THE 
2002 REFORM 
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(Puchniak 2003, emphasis added) 
Several criticisms have been directed at this new menu of 
corporate governance options, in concluding that little real change 
will eventuate (see generally for example Rodatz 2003). First, the 
requirement of ‘independence’ for directors (and indeed 
kansayaku) is thought not to be strict enough. However, that 
awaits clarification by the courts, and/or the risk that rules will be 
further tightened once a firm has sunk costs into transforming 
itself into a Reformed Old Type Company or especially a New 
Type Company.  
A second criticism is that the reform will not work because 
companies will not move especially from a Sony Type Company 
into a New Type Company, because this will expose their 
executive officers also to shareholder derivative actions (Kashiwagi 
2003, p.7). However, the risks for such officers are limited 
somewhat by the safeguards enacted in 2002. Anyway, many of 
those who have already gone to the trouble of becoming a Sony 
Type Company are likely to be firms which are better managed or 
genuinely want to improve their governance and overall 
performance.  
Third, the reform does not force companies to adopt a particular 
model; in other words, the reform is ‘elective’ (Nottage 2003). This 
criticism tends to be made particularly by US commentators, 
describing the ‘New Type Company’ as the US model and the 
most efficient one. A potential irony here is that at least some 
Japanese policy-makers are probably being more consistent with 
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the ideology of market liberalism generally propounded so 
vigorously in the US. Ahmadjian (2003: 230) observes that the 
logic of Japan’s Ministry of External Trade and Industry (METI, 
previously MITI) was that ‘the market would eventually decide 
which form of governance was most effective’. On the other hand, 
she concedes that METI had initially favoured more the New Type 
Company model, but leaving open a choice (to move also to a 
Reformed Old Type Company) ‘was a compromise under pressure 
from Keidanren … facing its own internal pressures, both from 
global firms that wanted to reshape their boards to reflect US 
practices, and from domestic firms which resisted change’.10 Less 
invasive pressure on companies to reform their governance 
structures has also been a hallmark of Anglo-Commonwealth 
countries, which have also drawn more or less on US features in 
fashioning the options (Puchniak 2003); and leaving in particular 
options based on the kansayaku system may reflect an enduring 
attraction of German corporate law, which moreover has 
implemented mostly on an optional basis (du Plessis 2004). 
However, as mentioned in the Conclusions below (Part III), the 
element of compromise – and its particular style: leaving in place 
existing structures, and just superimposing reformed structures – 
does appear to represent a ‘reformist conservatism’ found in other 
areas of Japanese law and society (Nottage 2001c). 
Thus, it is hardly compelling to argue that Japan’s ‘elective 
corporate governance reform’ does not go far enough yet, at the 
same time, it already signals a significant step towards ‘American-
style’ corporate governance (Senechal 2003). More interesting are 
                                            
10 Nippon Keidanren was formed in 2002 by amalgamating two important peak 
business bodies, Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organisations) and 
Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers' Associations). The former, in 
particular, includes larger firms which have increasingly pushed for 
liberalisation in Japan as they expanded their operations world-wide 
(Yoshimatsu 2000). The current Chairman of Nippon Keidanren (and Toyota), 
has been robust in his criticism of the Koizumi administration for not being 
decisive and innovative enough in carrying out structural reform (Okuda 2003). 
On changes in METI’s stance towards economic reform, see Elder 2003. 




prognoses like that of Ahmadjian (2003, p. 231) who argues that 
this reform illustrates nicely the thesis of ‘Japan’s managed 
globalisation’ based on ‘permeable insulation’ (Schaede and 
Grimes 2003). She predicts the emergence of: 
a dual system of governance[:) Globally oriented 
firms would increase board independence and 
introduce auditing, nomination and compensation 
committees, while more domestically focused firms 
would maintain the kansayaku system and continue 
to maintain managerial autonomy and insulation 
from the demands of shareholders.  
 
To some extent this appears to be proving correct, judging from 
reports of trends in adopting the New Type Company form since 
the option was implemented from June 2003. However, these are 
still early days, and a final assessment is further complicated by 
what is meant by ‘globally oriented firms’. Sony quickly became a 
New Type Company, and indeed went a step further than required 
by separating out the posts of Board Chairperson and Chief 
Executive Officer.11 The form has also been adopted by large 
companies particularly in the consumer electronics sector, with 
less foreign ownership, but certainly exposed to and engaging with 
highly competitive markets world-wide. However, of the 55 firms 
which had become New Type Companies by August 2003, several 
appear distinctly more domestically focused, such as large retailers 
and smaller banks (Kubori 2003, pp. 4-5). It could be that these 
firms want to become more ‘globally oriented’, either by attracting 
                                            
11 ‘Revised Commercial Code Introduces US-Style Corporate Governance’ 42(5) 
Japan Labor Bulletin (May 2003), p.2. Kashiwagi (2003, p. 5) sees this sort of step 
as crucial to the success of New Type Companies, to fracture a practice of 
Chairpersons (typically also CEOs) electing their successors, despite 
Nominating Committees in New Type Companies formally being required to 
have a majority of outside directors. 
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foreign investment or expanding into markets abroad, but that is 
difficult to prove. Another explanation may be that these firms 
now believe that New Type Companies have more efficient 
corporate governance, which translates into better economic 
performance, even primarily in domestic markets. They may also 
think that this is due to this form being ‘American’, and discount 
problems in the US exposed by corporate collapses like Enron’s, or 
believe in the form’s efficiency because they have heard of it or its 
variants being adopted in Anglo-Commonwealth countries or even 
some in continental Europe (Hill and Yablon 2003). But such 
‘global’ considerations may be minimal or non-existent for most of 
these firms, filtered out in the recommendations reached by 
policy-makers like METI, and the mass of media reporting on 
Japan’s now regular corporate law reforms.  
In short, even an intensification of more broad-based adoption of 
the New Type Company form may be better conceptualized as a 
pragmatic inculcation of more abstract or ‘indigenized’ 
expectations about governance and its putative links to economic 
performance.12 Nonetheless, this is occurring in the context of the 
other institutional and normative shifts towards more control by 
shareholders over managers, outlined above. Many of these 
involve more control-oriented mechanisms, which may resonate 
also with non-US traditions in operating companies. Although 
seemingly less noted or widely talked about (Kozuka 2003), arm’s 
length mechanisms – more representative of Americanisation 
generally – do continue to gain strength too in this important 
stakeholder relationship. 
                                            
12 On pragmatism and ‘creolisation’ in globalisation involving Japan, see 
generally Befu (2003, pp. 16-19). Kubori (2003, pp. 5-6) highlights another 
important practicality. By June 2006, even Old Type Companies must find at 
least two outside statutory auditors. Because this creates similar challenges to 
finding independent directors, he expects then a majority of well-known 
companies to become New Type Companies. 




B. CREDITORS, RECESSION, AND FINANCIAL MARKET DEREGULATION 
A distinctive feature of post-War corporate governance in Japan 
has been the greater importance of creditors as stakeholders, due 
to comparatively more use of bank rather than equity finance. Yet 
this characteristic has been fading over the last two decades, as 
companies accumulated retained earnings and gradual financial 
market deregulation permitted them to more readily raise funds 
through bond issues and so on. Another spate of recent reforms to 
the Commercial Code is aimed at further boosting equity finance, 
by giving investors and managers more choices over how to 
capitalize a new venture and more choices over how to meet the 
ongoing funding needs of the new business – just as share options 
and buybacks provide more choices over how to design incentive 
schemes to ensure its continued efficient operation. The logic 
behind the reforms is consistent with other government initiatives 
to shake Japan out of its protracted economic malaise. With news 
dominated still by bankruptcies and rising unemployment, the 
government hoped the reforms would spark corporate-led 
economic growth. The reasoning is that a more flexible toolkit of 
corporate finance tools should allow efficient, new businesses to 
replace failing, unproductive industries. More importantly, the 
greater range of financing options should empower expanding 
businesses to satisfy more flexibly their ongoing funding needs.  
The 151st annual session of the Diet in 2001 enacted a number of 
changes to allow greater freedom to determine the initial capital 
structure of a Japanese kabushiki kaisha (joint stock company, the 
main focus of this chapter). The key amendments, which came 
into effect on 1 October 2001, include: 
• abolishing the requirement that the issue price of shares at 
the time of incorporation must be a minimum of 50,000 
yen; 
• removing the prohibition on share splits that caused either 
(i) the aggregate nominal amount of the issued shares to 
exceed the stated capital or (ii) the amount of net assets per 
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stock to be less than 50,000 yen — moreover, share splits 
can now be effected by a board decision without a 
shareholder vote, even if it requires an amendment to the 
company’s articles of incorporation to increase the number 
of authorized shares; 
• abolishing par-value shares, thereby eliminating any 
differences between par-value shares and no-par shares; and 
• introducing the voting unit (tangen-kabu) system, under 
which a Japanese company may provide in its articles of 
incorporation that a certain number of its shares constitute 
one unit, that is, one voting right.  
Tanahashi (2002) argues that these amendment removed 
significant hurdles for fast-growing start-up companies. Prior to 
the amendments, the minimum share price requirement meant 
that early start-ups, often without significant net assets, would 
issue only a few shares. Company growth would cause these 
shares to represent significant value in the company, making it 
difficult to raise further funds by granting share options. Further, 
the post-split net asset requirement meant that share splits were 
not always possible. A possible stop-gap measure — issuing no-par 
shares at a nominal value pro-rata among all shareholders — was 
impractical in post-IPO companies, because it was not realistic to 
require all shareholders pay even nominal consideration for the 
newly issued shares. Therefore, abolishing minimum share prices, 
net asset value requirements for share splits and par-value shares 
— as well as allowing differential voting rights — has given start-
up companies greater flexibility in structuring their initial 
capitalisation to allow for future expansion.13   
Further, under Commercial Code amendments approved on 21 
November 2001 and coming into effect on 1 April 2002, 
corporations are able to streamline the means by which it can 
                                            
13 More generally on venture business, see for example Sibbitt 1998b. 




obtain ongoing equity financing, especially when multiple 
infusions of equity are required over a relatively short period of 
time. This allows for smooth financing of companies, particularly 
ventures and emerging companies which often cannot secure debt 
funding from banks. Under the former law, companies often 
needed to secure a special resolution — at a properly convened 
general meeting — to access equity finance during periods of high 
growth. Thus, the so-called ‘4:1 rule’ restricted the number of 
shares a company could issue in a given capital increase to four 
times the number of shares that the company already had 
outstanding. This meant that pre-IPO companies, seeking multiple 
infusion of equity financing, would have to go through a long, 
drawn-out series of issuances, each time convening a general 
meeting to secure a two-thirds vote to amend the number of 
authorized shares in its articles of incorporation. Adding to this 
complexity, the Commercial Code granted pre-emptive rights to 
shareholders for any new issuance of shares. Once again, a two-
thirds shareholder vote was required to issue new shares without 
honouring such pre-emptive rights.  
The new provisions simplify the procedures for growing business 
to acquire as-needed equity funding. Thus, the 4:1 rule no longer 
applies to closed companies (that is, those companies whose 
articles of incorporation require director transfers of shares); and 
shareholders can now authorize the board of a closed company to 
issue, at its discretion over a one year period, a specified number of 
new shares to third parties at favourable prices without honouring 
pre-emptive rights.  
In addition, the revised Commercial Code increases the types of 
shares publically listed companies may issue. These include: 
• preferred shares or non-common shares with no voting 
rights or with limited voting rights;  
• tracking shares, where the dividends are not fixed but 
linked to the performance of a certain segment or subsidiary 
of the issuing company; 
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• protected shares where holders can exercise veto rights in 
respect of certain company actions; and 
• mandatory convertible shares where the shares may be 
converted into another type of share at the discretion of the 
issuing company and not the holder. 
 
With these reforms only coming into effect in late 2001 and 2002, 
it is still too early to tell whether the new provisions are having 
their desired effect. However, as with the steady uptake in stock 
option and share buyback schemes mentioned above (Part II.2), 
there is some evidence that companies are enthusiastically taking 
advantage of their increased financing powers. 
Conversely, already in mid-1997 (before Japan’s banking crisis), a 
survey of managers found that 60 percent expected the role of 
‘main banks’ to decline (Yasui 1999: 12). The relative importance 
of equity markets in corporate finance will undoubtedly expand in 
importance in the wake of ongoing economic stagnation and the 
current severe credit crunch, combined with globalisation and 
broader financial market deregulation. The latter program was 
initiated at the end of 1996, but mostly from 1998, due to poor 
return on capital by Japanese financial institutions throughout the 
post-War period, and especially a rapid loss of global 
competitiveness in the 1990s. This ‘Big Bang’ (or ‘Long Bang’!) is 
now complete, and the legislative and structural reforms are very 
wide-ranging.14 
As mentioned above (Part II.1), like other stakeholder 
relationships, the relationship between creditors and managers 
gives rise to problems of adverse selection (leading to credit going 
too readily to risky firms) and of moral hazard (monitoring 
                                            
14A comprehensive time-line is available from the Ministry of Finance, at 
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/big-bang/ebb33.pdf; see also (Sibbitt 1998a). 




problems allowing poor projects by management). Blame for the 
abrupt decline in the Japanese financial sector over the 1990s lies 
in part with the Japanese government, particularly the Ministry of 
Finance (the Bank of Japan having become a more independent 
policy maker only recently). Yet Japanese financial institutions 
were also responsible for their own plight, having embarked on a 
huge spending spree in the late 1980s, which has led to the 
massive bad debts reported in recent years. Generally, this disaster 
stems from distortions in evaluating and pricing risk. Specifically, 
it relates to problems in corporate governance which encouraged 
financial institutions in Japan to lend (and invest) in risky firms, 
and then not adequately monitor managers in those firms (Kanaya 
and Woo 2000). 
One solution for these tensions between creditors and managers is 
to give creditors shares in the companies they lend to. This helps 
to the extent that shareholders generally can overcome agency 
problems vis-à-vis managers (on which, therefore, see again Part 
II.1). In addition, creditors can attempt to monitor managers in 
two main ways. One, again, involves more arm’s length control. 
The creditor still delegates much control to managers, but may 
step in to force bankruptcy, thus creating an incentive for 
managers to pursue creditors’ interests (Hoshi 1998: 853). 
However, forcing bankruptcy must be a credible option, and 
Japanese bankruptcy law has had various problems which only 
started to be addressed seriously towards the end of the 1990s 
(Anderson 2000: 700-24; Anderson 2001; Anderson and Steele 
2003). One result has been enactment of a more functional 
corporate reorganisation regime in 1999. From when the Civil 
Rehabilitation Law came into effect in April 2000 through to 
August 2002, 31 reoganisations had been initiated and 16 had been 
resolved in about six months, compared to an average of two years 
under the old Corporate Reorganisation Law over the same period 
(Xu 2003). Further, West (2003a: 25) observes that this regime, 
which also applied to individuals, was little used by them until 
amendments were added in 2000 (adding home mortgage 
exemptions, and so on). But he argues that its more ready 
availability and uptake since then has helped legitimate 
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bankruptcy and reduce its social stigma, even contributing to a 
decline in consumer debt related suicides. Although less or 
different stigma may be attached to bankruptcies for companies, 
this further ‘norm shift’ prompted by law reform seems likely to 
underpin increasing use of corporate insolvency options as arm’s 
length control mechanisms by creditors over the managers in 
firms they lend to. 
Alternatively, or in addition, creditors can adopt more control-
oriented strategies. They can monitor more directly the behaviour 
of managers, and intervene if necessary in their appointment or 
replacement. One way in which Japanese banks have been able to 
directly monitor their lenders’ managers, at least within Japan, has 
been by providing a range of services (such as general business 
advice or match-making) rather than just loans. Yet that was 
difficult in overseas lending; and encountered difficulties 
domestically as Japanese companies themselves became more 
sophisticated, and competition intensified as a result of 
accelerating financial markets deregulation (Ouandlous and 
Philippatos 1999). The latter, combined with the recessionary 
environment facing Japanese financial institutions in particular, 
also makes it more difficult to retain the long-term relationship 
required to be a firm’s ‘main bank’ (Yasui 1999: 12-13). Key aspects 
were a primary lender which also held shares over lengthy periods, 
and intervened especially in times of debtor’s financial distress by 
seconding bank managers. As banks become strapped for funds, 
however, they may call in their loans or simply refuse to lend 
more; an increase in lender liability claims by debtors was noted 
already in the mid-1990s (Milhaupt 1996: 49-55). More recently, 
other cases have been reported in which main banks did not save 
companies by providing loans, while in other instances they did 
not bear a disproportionate burden of losses following liquidation. 
A related phenomenon is a belated ‘flight to quality’ in lending, 
perversely exacerbating the present credit crunch. Finally, there is 
evidence of banks selling off their shareholdings, reportedly after 
client firms offloaded their stocks in banks, and in the shadow of 
dangerous declines in the ratio of market over book value (4:1 in 
1986, but only just over 1:1 in 1998 (Fukao 1999: 6-8)). Unwinding 




shareholdings prevents financial institutions remaining or 
developing into a main bank, better able to monitor debtor firms, 
and creates less incentive to send their own managers to debtor 
firms if in distress (especially as even the big banks have enough 
problems of their own nowadays!). Reputation as a main bank can 
unravel quickly, and is difficult to regain (Tsuru 1999: 8). 
Such breakdowns become even more likely as more and more 
foreign financial institutions have taken advantage of deregulation 
to enter the Japanese market since the late 1990s (Sibbitt 1998). 
These outsiders are particularly likely not to take over, and 
certainly not take on, even small shareholdings in debtor firms in 
such a changing environment. Even if they do, they may refuse to 
‘take turns’, accepting the delegation of other 
creditor/shareholders to send valuable management resources to 
help keep debtor firms alive. Their inclination, no doubt often in 
their short-term interest, may be to enforce their strict legal rights, 
calling in their security or forcing bankruptcy. After all, lending 
institutions (and associations) in Japan have long made sure that 
their strict rights are well protected by contract and commercial 
practice at the time of lending (Kanda 1998: 940). 
Three other factors continue to undermine the main bank system 
(Milhaupt 2001: 19-21). The first arises from the nationalisation 
and re-privatisation of the failed Long-Term Credit Bank. The 
government sold it to a group of foreign investors including 
Citigroup, giving a ‘put option’ to return any assets (loans) that 
decline from book value (as of 1 March 2000) by 20 percent or 
more within three years. But this is lost if the bank accepts a 
borrower’s request for loan forgiveness. In mid-2000, the re-
privatized bank refused to forgive debts owed by Sogo Department 
Store, forcing it into bankruptcy, going against what has been 
expected a main bank. More generally, bank failures like this one 
undercut an implicit guarantee against this given by the Japanese 
government (Milhaupt and Miller 1997), in exchange for strong 
institutions supporting weak ones through the main bank system. 
Finally, the Asian financial crisis and Japan’s long recession are 
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perceived to have caused a significant shift in beliefs about the 
benefits of bank-oriented corporate finance and governance. 
C. EMPLOYEES AND THE VICISSITUDES OF THE LABOUR MARKET 
Another often cited aspect of Japanese corporate governance, 
especially through to the 1980s, is also under threat: the strong 
influence of employees (for example Miwa 1998). The 
conventional wisdom has been that Japanese corporate governance 
was profoundly influenced by the orientation of companies first 
towards ‘people’ (ie employees), then ‘products’ (ie technically 
excellent goods), then ‘profits’ (for shareholders). This is contrasted 
with the German model (fixated first on products, then people, and 
then profits), and especially the Anglo-American model (first 
profits, then products, people last!). The importance of employees 
in Japanese companies has admittedly been strong, at least 
‘regular’ employees in larger corporations (a steadily declining 
proportion).15 Yet this factor can also be analyzed in terms of 
agency problems, and how their stakeholding in companies relates 
to that of other stakeholders. That analysis, together with 
observed tendencies in the labour market and important 
legislative amendments, points to further growing pressures on 
Japanese corporate governance.16 
Usually, discussions of relations between employees and managers 
centre on the latter as ‘principals’, attempting to hire the former as 
                                            
15 Lehmann 1997: 96-99. This relative ranking picture accords with some survey 
evidence included in a book published in 1997 by a Kyoto University economics 
professor (Tachibanaki 1999: 51). However, the proportion of non-regular 
employees continues to grow (Abe 2002). 
16 See also Fukao (1999: 21, 23).  But see Haley (2002: before note 19), asserting – 
still with very little empirical data on labour market transformations – that 
Japan will not change its fundamentally ‘communitarian’ orientation without 
change in what sees as the most distinctive and central institutional feature of 
post-War Japan: ‘entry level hiring coupled with a central personnel office 
staffed by senior career manager(s) with full responsibility for the recruitment, 
training, assignment and promotion of career staff’. 




‘agents’ despite the possibility of adverse selection, and to monitor 
their delegated activities despite moral hazard (‘shirking’, due 
again to imperfect information in the relationship). This can 
simply be reversed to analyze implications for corporate 
governance. The problem then becomes how employees, as 
principals, constrain managers, agents who may prefer to fritter 
away company funds on themselves. One solution is to give 
employees shares in the company. However, Employee Share 
Ownership Programmes (ESOPs) still do not play such a major role 
in Japanese corporate governance (Hayakawa 1997), and will only 
constrain managers to the extent that agency problems between 
shareholders and managers are resolved generally (Part II.2 above). 
Otherwise, the only realistic alternative is more control-oriented 
measures. One example is the two-tier board structure for 
Germany stock companies, in which a supervisory board is partly 
elected by employees, and then appoints management board 
members (du Plessis 2004). Japanese corporate law provides no 
such formal mechanism for employee supervision of managers. 
Yet control arises in practice especially because most managers in 
large Japanese companies have been appointed from among 
existing employees, in a system of life-long employment and 
promotion based primarily on seniority. Correspondingly, the 
external labour market has not grown much in recent decades.  
Again, the origins of such institutions are unclear. Like several 
supposedly distinctive features of Japanese law (such as limited 
numbers of practising lawyers (Haley 1978), the practice of lifelong 
employment seems to have taken root only quite recently (cf also 
Foote 1996). Gilson and Roe (1999: 520) observe that ‘from World 
War I through to the end of World War II, worker mobility in 
external labor markets eroded labor stability when labor was tight, 
and employees’ willingness to fire even senior workers eroded 
labor stability when labor markets were not tight. Employees tried 
but failed to build wage and seniority structures to induce workers 
to stay during labor shortages. Government intervention reduced 
but failed to stop turnover’. They argue that lifetime employment 
practices arose in the even more unlikely economic environment 
shortly after World War II, characterized by extreme labour 
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surplus, because of exceptional political events. Rapid 
unionisation and radical worker activism (strikes and plant 
takeovers) prompted conservative reactions and a ‘deal’ 
establishing a privileged segment of labour (mainly surviving 
employees) accorded lifetime employment. Thereafter, ‘Japan’s 
economic problem was to craft associated institutions that could 
function effectively given the politically imposed lifetime 
employment’, including restrictions in external labour markets 
(ibid: 524). Yet nowadays Japan faces a very different political as 
well as economic environment, with record unemployment (and 
further ‘under-employment’), and institutional changes opening up 
the possibility again of increasing worker mobility through 
external labour markets. Gilson and Roe (ibid: 540) also identify 
several significant ‘stress points’ in the post-War Japanese system. 
For instance, it does not cope well during times of dramatic 
technological change,17 and ‘competition’ among lifelong 
employees for promotion in an internal labour market will not 
work effectively when firms no longer are growing.  
Rather similarly, Shishido (2000: 222) points out that labour 
turnover rates in the 1920s and 1930s were almost the same as 
those in the US, but the latter jumped in the 1940s and have 
remained much higher ever since. He argues that the 
transformation in the US was linked to the Great Depression, and 
that if the Japanese recession continues there will be an 
irreversible decline in lifetime employment as a key aspect 
sustaining the post-War corporate governance system in Japan. 
More generally, ongoing recession creates a zero-sum situation and 
heightens conflicts between employees and other stakeholders, 
notably shareholders. The latter will no longer tolerate employees 
being treated as de facto residual claimants, for instance earning 
wage hikes or salary bonuses while dividends remain constant or 
decline (cf also Ghosn 2003: 17). In parallel, Shishido (ibid: 217) 
                                            
17 Including significant developments in IT in the late 1990s, after an admittedly 
slow start at least compared to the US (Nottage 1998, Ibusuki and Nottage 2002, 
Jain 2002). 




identifies considerable strengthening of the external labour market 
and the corporate control (share-) market. 
Labour law scholars such as Yamakawa (1999), perhaps due to 
reliance on more historical data, are more impressed by the 
enduring quality of the post-War model; but note a number of 
major challenges to this model. One is precisely the broader 
political economy environment. The recession plus deregulation 
create more variability in corporate profitability, a key factor as 
the credit crunch still facing Japanese financial institutions further 
encourages companies to turn to stock and bond markets — often 
global, and more demanding of good corporate and managerial 
performance. In addition, the service sector continues to grow in 
importance, bringing the need for (and the possibility of) more 
flexible working hours (cf also Hanami 1999). Both factors are 
related to changing demographics in the labour force generally, 
characterized by more elderly people, women, and part-time 
workers (Kezuka 2000). This also affects the resilience of lifelong 
employment as a core concept in the Japanese corporate world. 
Yamakawa (2001) still concludes that it will remain, albeit with 
some modifications. Data from various surveys supports such 
conclusions, although also often confirming a move towards 
performance-based remuneration.18 However, a problem with 
most of these surveys is that they question incumbents within 
firms. To get a better picture of the future of this central aspect of 
Japan’s employment and corporate governance systems, more 
research should be conducted into what young people want 
nowadays. Certainly it seems that they are disillusioned with the 
fact that present employment patterns in Japan are strongly biased 
towards the incumbent, older generation, especially those in 
lifelong employment (Genda 1999, 2003).  
                                            
18 See the three surveys over 1999-2000 summarized in Nottage 2001b; and 
generally Abe 2002. 
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In addition, Yamakawa (2001) surveys major changes recently 
made to an array of labour legislation. These should cement in 
place or encourage broader transformations in the labour market 
in Japan, sometimes following changes in norms and/or underlying 
socio-economic institutions (as with takeovers: Milhaupt 2001) 
and sometimes rather prompting them (as with consumer 
bankruptcy reform: West 2003a). These changes include, for 
instance:19 
• 1998 amendments to the Labour Standards Law: allowing 
longer-term labour contracts; requiring written 
clarifications of work conditions upon hire, and reasons for 
termination (a growing source of tension); and divorcing 
overtime payments from hours worked (indicating more 
stress on quality of work); 
• 1997 amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Law (Wolff 2003): now prohibiting discrimination in 
recruitment, assignment, promotion, as well as in dismissal 
and retirement; compelling employers to mediation if 
requested by employees; and addressing problems of sexual 
harassment (still a frequent source of litigation, since the 
early 1990s); 
• 1995 amendments (in effect from April 1999) to the Child 
Care Law: extending leave to provide care to elderly family 
members (Webb 2002); 
• 1999 enactment of a Fundamental Law for a Gender-Equal 
Society (which may encourage affirmative action 
                                            
19 Further details on these and related changes affecting especially Japan’s 
external labour market are set out in (Nottage and Wolff 2000-3, paras JPN ¶60-
003 ff) and (Nottage 2001b). Updated information can be found readily in the 
regular publications freely available from the Japan Institute for Labour Policy 
and Training (formerly the Japan Institute of Labour, at 
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/index.html), as well as the extra recent references 
cited in the text. 




programmes, or other broader transformations in women’s 
work: cf generally Miller 2003); 
• 1999 amendments to the Working Dispatching Law: 
abolishing the ‘positive list’ system of limiting dispatching 
to specified (professional) job categories, in favour of a 
‘negative list’ system; and putting pressure on companies 
using such temporary helpers to offer them employment 
first if the company decide to hire for work done by them 
(potentially creating a new hybrid category of employees); 
• Simultaneous amendments to the Employment Security 
Law: also changing to a ‘negative list’ system for private 
placement of non-temporary workers; clearer licensing for 
businesses doing this; and replacement of a blanket fee 
maximum chargeable (which hampered attempts to head-
hunt and place managers) (West 2003b: 17-20); 
• moves to promote pension plans based on ‘defined 
contributions’ pension, rather than just ‘defined benefits’ 
(which had discouraged voluntary job-switching, because 
complete vesting was unusual). 
In addition to recent changes in the legal environment, and long-
standing transformations in political economy broadly related to 
globalisation described at the start of this Part, globalisation is also 
beginning to have a more direct effect on the Japanese labour 
market. In the boom times of the 1980s, many ‘guest workers’ 
were brought in for blue-collar work which Japanese were 
unwilling to touch. Many have stayed on, often illegally. Yet a 
significant feature of the 1990s has been a slowly growing presence 
of white-collar employees and managers, even at the highest 
executive level. This is most noticeable in the financial sector, but 
it is tied to broader patterns in foreign direct investment, 
especially increasing Mergers and Acquisitions involving 
companies from abroad (Milhaupt and West 2001). While it is too 
early to say what independent effect these developments will have 
on the labour market in Japan, cumulatively they reinforce the 
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changes described above, impacting on the future of corporate 
governance in Japan. 
D. CONFLICTING TENDENCIES IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND THE 
STATE? 
Thus, applying basic principal-agent theory to analyze three key 
aspects of Japanese corporate governance suggests that the 
interests of managers and shareholder have drawn closer together; 
that severe challenges have emerged for corporate finance centred 
on main banks; but pressures reshaping employment relations may 
be less obvious and consolidate only over the longer term. Overall, 
this amounts to more convergence towards arm’s length relations 
characteristic of Anglo-American corporate governance. Further 
complicating the picture, however, the notion of opportunism 
underlying principal-agent theory may not be the only force at 
work. This become apparent when we look at further stakeholders 
in the firm. 
Another important set of stakeholders, affecting the relations 
among the others described so far, consists of the firm’s outside 
suppliers and customers. Particularly intriguing are the 
cooperative relations which have developed among firms, 
especially in the automobile industry, notably in post-war Japan 
but later finding root in the US. Some recent studies of industrial 
organisation have focused on ‘learning by monitoring’ in this 
industry (and some others), involving: (i) benchmarking (exacting 
surveys of current and likely future products and processes) to 
uncover new general products, (ii) simultaneous engineering 
(where sub-units responsible for components undertake similar 
benchmarking, while considering implications for other sub-units, 
which may lead to redefining the project as a whole), and (iii) 
systems of strict error detection and correction for the new 
routines, with further extensive information sharing to respond 
quickly before consequences become disastrous (Helper, McDuffie 
and Sabel 2000: 466). The emergence of this paradigm suggests 
that pervasive patterns of information sharing may entrench 
norms of cooperation, seen not just as a means of securing 




individual benefits but rather as an end in itself, underpinned by a 
vision of ‘enlarging the pie’ rather than trying to obtain a larger 
slice at the others’ expense. History also shows how dramatic 
changes in conditions may unravel such collaborative relations (as 
in the US automobile industry over the 1950s-70s), but then build 
them up again as underlying mechanisms become apparent (as in 
the 1980s-90s) (ibid: 476-7).  
It is not yet clear what has happened to relations among firms in 
Japan’s automobile industry, especially since the late 1990s, when 
the changes to other aspects of corporate governance described 
above appeared to find more traction. Despite some notable 
developments, the economic and social logic underpinning 
cooperative inter-firm relations may prove resistant in this 
industry. It is demonstrably more successful, and still holds 
reserves to draw on, compared for instance to Japan’s weak 
financial sector. Further, although Japan’s auto manufacturers are 
now using e-commerce to unwind keiretsu or preferential 
relationships with suppliers for standardized products, they seem 
to be retaining such relationships for more technologically 
complex parts.20 Relative stasis in such an important production 
chain would present a tension with the trends towards change 
identified above (Parts II.1-3), even if the latter relations (mostly 
within the firm) are more determinative of corporate governance. 
But a similar tension arguably characterized the US over the 1980s 
and 1990s, as contracting among firms (at least in some 
manufacturing and services sectors) became more based on 
information sharing and learning by monitoring, yet arm’s length 
control and market-based coordination increasingly characterized 
corporate governance in its narrower sense (Sabel 1996). 
The (re-)entrenchment of learning by monitoring mechanisms in 
the US at the level of industrial production, and their possible 
resilience in Japan, may encourage the emergence of novel forms 
                                            
20 Kashiwagi (2001: 3.b.v). See also Farrell & Findlay (2004: 258-65). Generally, 
on the ambivalent changes in the industry, see for example Ghosn 2003. 
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of corporate governance in both countries: ‘corporate incubators’ 
for strategic thinking established within firms, performance 
metrics based on baskets of measures subjected to continuous 
review and redefinition, and venture capitalists. However, these 
applications are less well established than in industrial production, 
and are thought to run more risk of being displaced by more 
straightforward market-based corporate governance mechanisms 
(Helper et al 2000: 477-501). 
On the other hand, they may also be supported by similar 
processes of learning by monitoring being played out at other 
levels implicating two further stakeholders in corporate 
organisations. The first is individual consumers and their 
organisations, as opposed to business customers of firms. Traces of 
the three elements characteristic of ‘learning by monitoring’ 
model described above – benchmarking by the person requiring the 
goods, simultaneous engineering by sub-units involving in 
production, and careful error detection and reporting – seem at 
least partially applicable to the relationships that build up to link 
consumers via retailers to manufacturers. A key premise is pro-
active and demanding consumers, prepared to voice their needs 
and complaints, but this is precisely what has emerged quite 
steadily since World War II and particularly since the 1990s.21 In 
recent years, this has seemed more to involve a more cynical and 
confrontational attitude on the part of consumers. However, a new 
equilibrium may now be close, involving patterns of more 
pervasive and balanced information sharing that may entrench 
new norms of cooperation based on mutual respect. 
The model is more directly applicable at the level of the state, as a 
second broader stakeholder in corporate organisations. An 
important parallel trend in advanced industrialized democracies 
appears to be ‘democratic experimentalism’ (Dorf and Sabel 1998), 
involving: (a) central authorities which ‘create a framework for 
                                            
21 Maclachlan 2002; Nottage and Trezise 2003; Nottage 2004: especially 8-16. 




experimentation by defining broad problems, setting provisional 
standards, pooling measurements of local performance, aiding poor 
performers to correct their problems, and revising standards and 
overall goals according to results’; and (b) ‘local units doing most 
of the problem-solving but which are ‘accountable to the center, 
and to their local constituents, who participate in formulating its 
plans, and judge it both against those goals and in comparison to 
the performance to the performance of other locales in like 
circumstances’ (Sabel and O’Donnell 2000: 17). Key parameters in 
experimentation involving the state are again transparency and 
participation by diverse affected actors, to prompt access to — and 
effective use of — information to develop collaborative and 
effective relations. Important trends in this direction in Japan 
nowadays include: 
• sweeping deregulation programmes, although these have 
tended to get bogged down in detail and bureaucracy (Katz 
2002);  
• enactment of comprehensive official information disclosure 
legislation in 1999 (Shultz 2001);  
• more engagement with foreigners and foreign models, at 
some levels (Clark 2000; Takao 2003); 
• some legal recognition of previously marginalized ethnic 
groups (Stewart 2003); 
• adroit attempts by other minorities to avoid ‘bureaucratic 
capture’ while improving their lot (Nakamura 2001); 
• more support for such initiatives through reforms of 
legislation involving Non-Profit Organisations (Pekkanen 
2000); and 
• greater opportunities to build on traditions of local 
autonomy in Japan (Jain 2000). 
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These shifts are also underpinned by major reforms underway 
since 2001 regarding access to justice in Japan, although driven 
also by business interests (Kitagawa and Nottage 2004). To be sure, 
such steps towards a more vibrant civil society (Schwartz and 
Pharr eds, 2003) may have been more faltering even than in some 
neighbouring countries, like Korea (see eg Ginsburg 2001). Yet 
significant momentum has been generated in Japan over the last 
decade, pointing the way towards more sustained polyarchic 
‘deliberative democracy’ there too (cf generally Cohen and Sabel 
1997). This adds further contingencies and difficulties in assessing 
existing and potential changes in Japanese corporate governance, 
pressuring firms into taking ‘corporate social responsibility’ more 
seriously (Iwai and Kobayashi 2003: 12). But these more political 
dimensions may prove to be the most crucial, despite having been 
overlooked by most theorists during Japan’s lost decade.22 The 
seeming paralysis of Japanese policy-makers can then be seen in a 
more positive light. Perhaps it shows important elements of 
‘democratic experimentalism’, with (a) central authorities slowly 
reorganising key building blocks after extensive analysis of world-
wide trends, but (b) leaving it primarily to social-economic sub-
units (such as major stakeholders in firms including creditors and 
employees, with their peak associations) to find a new balance and 
forms of governance combining efficiency with normative 
acceptability (cf for example West 2001a). However, that more 
positive assessment turns crucially on whether the Japanese state 
is and will remain committed to fostering information flows and 
decentralized participation in decision-making among diverse 
socio-economic groups. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has outlined a broad conception of corporate 
governance incorporating a variety of stakeholders both within 
and outside firms, considering information flows among some of 
                                            
22 See, however, Fort and Schipani 2000: 865; Ballon and Honda 2000: xviii; and 
Gilson and Roe 1999. 




them. A primary aim has been to assess the extent of change in 
Japan, particularly towards a ‘US’ model dominated by shareholder 
interests and arm’s length relationships. Key actors and 
relationships, and some of the shifts, are depicted in Figure 1 
below: 
FIGURE 1: CONCENTRIC CIRCLES OF STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE 
 
Mgr  = Managers 
Sh  = Shareholders 
Eee  = Employees 
Sup  = Suppliers 
Cer  = Consumers 
Govt  = State 
NGO  = Non-Government   
Organisations 
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The darkened core includes the stakeholders which have 
traditionally been of most concern to substantive corporate law 
applied to public listed companies. First, shareholders, and their 
relationships with managers, have been of key doctrinal 
significance. Part II.1 showed how this has grown in practical 
importance particularly since the 1990s, strongly pulling 
shareholders towards the centre of Japan’s brave new world of 
corporate governance. Although the expanding relative importance 
of shareholders is partly achieved through more direct controls 
(such as derivative suits), more arm’s length control is also 
increasing. Second, the stakeholder position of employees has only 
recently been highlighted in corporate governance discussions 
focused on Anglo-American-Australian law and practice, 
particularly in the aftermath of large corporate insolvencies (Hill 
and Yablon 2003). But its significance has long been apparent in 
Japan, at least since the 1950s, especially in the form of life-long 
employment and other de facto constraints on managers of large 
companies. Despite considerable durability of the latter model, 
however, distinctions and arm’s length relationships are emerging 
between employees and managers. The role of employees, as 
stakeholders independently monitoring managers, is therefore 
declining (Part II.3).23 Thirdly, creditors have also found little 
formal recognition within substantive corporate law, yet their 
stakeholder role became clear in post-War Japan through the main 
bank system. The latter’s decline and corresponding moves to 
encourage further emphasis on equity financing, underpinned by 
financial markets deregulation, may even be propelling creditors 
                                            
23 Proposed whistle-blowing legislation may offset this tendency, despite 
problems with draft legislation submitted to Cabinet (‘A Whistle-Blower Bill 
Has Insufficient Safeguards’, International Herald Tribune (Herald Asahi), 24 
January 2004). However, whistle-blowing may actually reinforces the 
distinction between employees and managers, and it helps other stakeholders 
(notably shareholders), so law reform and practice in this area constitutes 
another facet of a transfigured corporate governance regime evolving now in 
Japan. 




outside the realm of core stakeholders in Japanese corporate 
governance (Part II.2). 
Fourthly, suppliers may be drawn into or nearer the core, to the 
extent that long-term collaborative relationships based on 
information-sharing through ‘learning through monitoring’ can be 
maintained or expanded. Their situation is ambivalent, however, 
because many supply relationships are becoming much more arm’s 
length, due to deregulation and ongoing recession. Simply ‘exiting’ 
is easier in such relationships, so they may result in diminished 
potential for mutual monitoring between suppliers and buyers. By 
contrast, consumers and their interest groups represent a fifth set 
of stakeholders which has become more actively engaged in firms, 
highlighting a greater role in corporate governance. That tendency 
is supported by broader shifts, finally, involving the state and its 
citizens. The Japanese government has blatant interests in 
corporate performance – notably economic recovery and 
restoration of the tax base – which make it important as a direct 
stakeholder. It is also significant more indirectly, by intensifying 
deregulation and other structural reforms which have already 
prompted major realignments in other stakeholder relationships 
within Japanese corporate governance. Another more subtle role 
for the state in Japan nowadays may be to reinforce variants of the 
‘learning by monitoring’ model, based on a more optimistic and 
‘embedded’ view of human relationships (Swedberg and 
Granovetter eds, 2001) than that underpinning agency theory 
analyses of information flows (Part II.4). 
Thus, as we move out beyond the core of Japan’s corporate 
governance world depicted above, the picture becomes 
increasingly complicated. The extent of change in the 
relationships affecting more peripheral stakeholders, and what 
concerns and philosophies are driving those relationships, become 
more difficult to explain or predict. By contrast, change is clearer 
at the core, even allowing for the tendency of comparative lawyers 
to see more transformations or convergence when comparing law-
related phenomena more narrowly (Nottage 2001a). There are 
indeed considerable tendencies towards convergence on a 
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shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance, at the 
expense of an employee-oriented one and especially a bank-
oriented model.  
Yet, the control mechanisms are not just more arm’s length ones, 
fitting best with US socio-economic ideology. Straightforward 
‘Americanisation’ is also undermined by some ongoing attraction 
of German (and now EU) traditions, or even Anglo-
Commonwealth variants of the ‘US model’. Perhaps most 
importantly, as we progress beyond the core concerns of corporate 
lawyers, the complex and shifting role of the state reminds us that 
much will depend on political contingencies. On the one hand, 
Japan’s recent ‘elective corporate governance reform’ show a 
tendency towards ‘reformist conservatism’ consistent with other 
recent law-related reforms, notably legal education (Nottage 
2001c). A sense emerges of a wide-ranging crisis and that 
something must be done, but the change ends up superimposing a 
new model on top of an old one (rather than abandoning the latter) 
with more or less incentives to adopt the new model. The 
incentives have been more pervasive in legal education reform, but 
weaker or more disparate so far for corporate organisation, 
depending for example on the degree to which firms and their 
sectors are open to global competitive pressures (Schaede and 
Grimes 2003). On the other hand, there seem likely to be limits to 
generalisations about Japan’s new political environment and 
policy-making processes (cf Grimes and Schaede 2003). Broader 
promotion of ‘learning by monitoring’ within and by Japan’s polity 
may also reinforce growing value pluralism (Moehwald 2000), and 
it may be possible to track the latter’s complex bedding down in 
general and specific policy-making processes impacting on 
corporate governance and commercial regulation more generally 
(see generally Huntington and Harrison 2000). However, 
ultimately or in some areas, the interactions may become so 
complex that they may be understood more parsimoniously by 
applying something like ‘chaos theory’, which focuses on how 
small regular iterations can result in large and often counter-
intuitive changes (cf generally for example Williams and Arrigo 
2001).  




What is clear already, from the broad-based analyses of changes of 
corporate governance outlined in this chapter, is that corporate 
law in Japan is playing an integral role in this process (see also for 
example Kanda and Milhaupt 2003). Indeed, changes to corporate 
law – and areas of law impacting on stakeholders in a broader 
sense than other than those focused on by corporate law itself – 
seem to have been quite dramatic and effective. This is ironic from 
the perspective of the US, where corporate practices and 
expectations changed well before corporate law was transfigured, 
and prominent commentators expect that this phenomenon is a 
powerful one elsewhere (Hansmann and Kraakman 2001). Other 
commentators seem to have underestimated the potential, at least 
in Japan, for law to prompt ongoing socio-economic change in 
Japan (for example Milhaupt 2003: 29-31; cf generally Aoki 2003). 
Yet law’s precise role remains intriguing — sometimes cementing 
or following social norms or institutional changes; sometimes 
prompting considerable transformations.  
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